So North Carolina and Indiana give us a split decision in the race for the Democratic nomination for president. Could John McCain be any happier?
It appears a very good possibility that the Democratic nominee will be selected this summer at the Nominating Convention in Denver. While the Republican hierarchy can be seen high-fiving themselves in the backrooms, Democratic leaders like Chairman Howard Dean are aghast. They are desperate for “peace in the party” and will continue their efforts to have a nominee crowned by acclimation before the convention. They might conced in forcing Hillary Clinton from the race, but my guess is it’s not going to happen.
Dean and his cohorts on the Democratic National Committee have nobody but themselves to blame for their current plight. They are so politically correct that even when a candidate wins a primary, the loser gets almost as much benefit. They are so used to seeing early knock-out blows in primary contests when candidates who lose one or two contests drop out, they don’t know what to do now that two candidates are committed to staying the course and neither can win enough delegates from voters to capture the nomination. Unless Clinton quits, which I don’t see happening unless she loses West Virginia next week (she’s expected to win there), then the process that the Democratic Party selected will simply play itself out. As WC Fields might have said, “My hat, my cane, Jeeves. We’re going to the convention.”
Consultants to Clinton and Obama would be well advised to track down some old guard Republican operatives to pick their brains about convention strategies in Denver. The last time a nominee was up in the air when the convention was gaveled to order was on the Republican side: 1976, at Kemper Arena in Kansas City. The Democratic candidates should study the lessons from this precedent.
It was August in the year the nation celebrated its bicentennial. The country was torn between a spirit of excitement coming off a glorious tribute a month earlier to America’s 200 years as the beacon of democracy, and the continuing national hangover from the Watergate scandal that forced Richard Nixon from office in disgrace in 1974. Ronald Reagan, fresh off eight years as California’s governor, ran a spirited campaign as an outsider, challenging incumbent President Gerald R. Ford at every opportunity. It was a hard-fought and often bitter campaign. Ford lacked the strong base customarily associated with a sitting president, owing to his ascension to office following Nixon’s forced resignation. Reagan, the conservative, had the money and the organization to campaign throughout the country, and resisted countless efforts by Republican insiders to convince him to step aside in the interest of party unity.
Reagan knew that he had to gamble to win at the convention. Ford already held the office. The challenger doesn’t dethrone the champion with a split decision. Reagan needed a knock out punch in Kansas City. As the August 16th opening day of the convention approached, his advisors feverishly plotted strategy. What they came up with was the idea of forcing a floor vote at the convention on an issue they hoped would force some Ford delegates to vote with the Reaganistas, even while pledging their loyalty to Ford. I have always felt this was a brilliant strategy – if Reagan could win this “test vote,” the media would trumpet it as a major victory for the challenger and a stunning defeat for the incumbent. It would create incredible momentum for Reagan on the eve of the nomination vote, resulting in a convention climate that made it easier for him to convince delegates to go with him. Unfortunately for Reagan, the brilliance of the strategy was foiled in its tactical implementation.
One of the major issues in the 1976 Republican race was the Panama Canal. This canal was built with American taxpayer money for the purpose of ensuring safe and speedy passage for American ships to expand the import and export of goods. Under long established foreign policy agreements, control of the canal was set to revert to Panama. Reagan was opposed to this, and most Republicans agreed with him. Ford, ever the Washington insider, was firmly committed to turning the canal over to Panama as scheduled. I can almost hear the line from the stump speech Reagan gave countless times each day: “We built it. We paid for it. It’s ours, and we’re going to keep it.” [Pause for thunderous applause.]
This is the issue the Reagan campaign should have picked as their test vote. They could have forced a floor fight to amend the party platform to put Republicans on record as opposing the give away of the Panama canal. Sadly, they instead decided to attempt to force both candidates to name their Vice Presidential selection prior to the nominating vote. They figured that Ford would pick someone who would either alienate the moderate or conservative wings of the party, both of which were heavily represented at the convention. (Liberal Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, at Ford’s private urgings, had already made it clear that he would not seek to be on the ticket. Though he was a political liability, Ford selected Rockefeller as Vice President because he believed him qualified to assume the presidency should Ford die in office – something that twice very nearly happened. See Lynette “Squeaky” Fromme and Sarah Jane Moore.)
To press their case, Reagan announced that moderate U.S. Senator Richard Schweiker from Pennsylvania would be his running mate. Who, Reagan demanded, would run with Ford? Shouldn’t delegates know in advance who else would be on the ticket when casting their deciding vote for president? Unfortunately for Reagan, the Schweiker gambit backfired. Conservatives who strongly backed Reagan were sharply critical of the selection, and the air was out of the strategic balloon. Ford was able to defeat the proposed rules change on a vote of 1180 to 1069, closely shadowing his nomination on a first ballot vote of 1187 to 1070.
But that wasn’t the end of the convention intrigue. Sensing the damage that might come from a fiercely divided convention, party elders convinced President Ford that he needed to make Reagan his Vice Presidential running mate. Ford hated Reagan and felt him to be a disloyal, opportunistic cowboy. But Ford wanted to win more than he hated Reagan, and offered the VP spot to the former California governor. Reagan turned him down. But before he left Kansas City, Reagan gave a stirring speech that vastly overshadowed President Ford’s own remarks, leaving many delegates to wonder if they’d made the correct choice. Ford ended up running with Kansas Senator Bob Dole and went on to lose the presidency to Jimmy Carter.
The parallels between 1976 and 2008 are striking. If Hillary Clinton stays in the race, will she seek a test vote in Denver like Reagan did in Kansas City? If so, a vote to seat the Michigan and Florida delegations would seem to be tailor made for her. The Democratic nominee can’t capture the White House without those states, so how can they refuse to count the votes of these delegates at the convention?
Will Obama, like Ford, be able to convince delegates that because he has a lead in elected delegates, states won and popular vote cast, that he has effectively won the nomination?
Will the eventual Democratic nominee be forced to name his/her rival as the running mate even though the two hate each other? And if the offer is made, would it be accepted?
And will the losing candidate use the convention to give a speech that so outshines the victor as to leave the delegates wondering about their choice?
* * *
My ex-wife, Barbara, was Ronald Reagan’s secretary during his 1976 run for the White House. She worked directly with Mr. Reagan and his senior staff, putting in 20+ hour days on the campaign trail to keep the machinery humming. How campaigning has changed since back in the day. In ’76, there was no 24 hour news cycle and no Google news alerts. To get the news from across the country, the Reagan team had trusted volunteers camp out at newspaper printing offices in several key cities to grab the first edition of the paper as it came hot off the press, usually around midnight. They’d look for coverage of the presidential race, and then call Barbara to read it to her. She’d sit in her tiny hotel room in whatever city Regan was stumping in, pen and steno notebook in hand, phone cradled against her neck, cigarette dangling from her lips, transcribing every word in shorthand. Then she grabbed the greatest piece of office equipment ever invented to that point in time – the self-correcting IBM Selectric typewriter – and typed out the news stories. Next she fired up the mimeograph machine (that’s right - they didn’t have a photo copier) and ran off the stack of typed stories. Assuming the thing didn’t break down (which it frequently did), she finally slipped the collection of news articles under the doors of Reagan’s senior advisers (Deaver, Hanaford, Meese, Nofziger, etc.) and the great man himself. When they awoke to read the morning news, she was going to bed to catch a couple of hours sleep before heading to the campaign plane and off to another city. Barbara certainly had her share of problems and our marriage didn’t last, but once upon a time, back in the day, the woman definitely had game. She passed away from lung cancer last year. RIP.
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